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AUDITING IN THE ATHENIAN STATE OF
THE GOLDEN AGE
(500-300 B.C.)
Abstract: Accountability and control of state revenues and expenditures in the
Athenian state of the Golden Age was achieved through the verification process
by three board of state accountants, based on the accounting records of execution and related budgetary and other documents. More specifically, the purpose
of this process was to (a) strengthen the integrity of the accounting system by
providing additional controls in the management or state resources, (b) establish
accountability against any public officials in charge of public funds, and (c) provide dependable reports to the people on the management of these funds. The
three boards were the Council Accountants, the Administration Accountants and
the Examiners. Although the main purpose of the attest function was the discovery of fraud, internal controls were also evaluated by comparing the formalized budgets with the accounting records of execution. This conclusion is somewhat contrary to the assumption that internal controls were not recognized in
ancient times.

In addition to the use of individualized budgets by the Athenian
state of the Golden Age of Greece,1 accountability and control of
state revenues and expenditures was achieved through the verification process by three boards of state accountants, based on the accounting records of execution and related budgetary and other documents. More specifically, the purpose of this process was to
(a) strengthen the integrity of the accounting system by providing
additional controls in the management of state resources, (b) establish accountability against any public officials in charge of public
funds, and (c) provide dependable reports to the people on the management of these funds.
The requirement for audit
The Athenian State of the Golden Age was organized under a system characterized by division of authority, due to the people's distrust of a centralized government. Thus, the business affairs of the
state were administered jointly by various boards which consisted
of groups of individuals selected or appointed by lot. These boards
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bore various titles, such as logistai (accountants), euthynoi (examiners), and the like. Each board usually consisted of ten members,
one from each tribe, so that each was represented. The focal point
of all these boards was the Council which was charged with full responsibility for the management of all political and economic affairs
of the state.
The Council elected qualified people by lot from its membership
to perform various accounting duties. Thus, accountants were the
persons who dealt with the work of keeping the accounts and accounting offices were the places where these people worked and
kept the records. The magistrates then, who administered the public funds, were accountable or under account, being subject to both
the examination and audit upon the expiration of their term of office.
Once the execution of plans was properly authorized through budgets or other documents, these public officials were then appointed
and charged with the responsibility to collect revenues or to incur
expenditures according to the authorization given. Before entering
office, they were required to submit to a formal scrutiny by an examining body which was usually a law court.
The next step was to make sure that these public officials administered the public funds according to the will of the people and
within the existing laws and regulations. It was necessary to demonstrate that the integrity of the system had been preserved. This was
the responsibility of professional people known as logistai (accountants), to whom the Athenian Constitution2 had granted this authority and responsibility. The Constitution provided for the rigorous
audit of the records of all public officers at the close of their year
of office. It dealt not only with the handling of public funds, but it
also required that every official act be passed upon a board of state
accountants. The accountants' findings were subject to a review by
a court.3 The Constitution also gave full opportunity to any citizen
to bring charges against the magistrates for any improper or illegal
action.
In the work of Aeschines we find more detail information as to
who these magistrates were and what legal restrictions were imposed upon them during the period for which they were "answerable". This period ran from the time their office ended until they
had undergone final examination. Accordingly, he states:
In this city so ancient and so great, no man who has held
any public trust is free from audit.
Then, he continues, specifying whom the law considers as being accountable:
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. . . (a) priests and priestesses be subject to audit, all collectively, and each severally and individually; (b) the
triearchs be subject to audit, though they have no public
funds in their hands; (c) the Council of Aeropagus is required by the law to file its accounts with the Board of
Auditors and to submit to their examination; and (d) the
Council of the Five Hundred to be subject to the audit.4
As to legal restriction, Aeschines also states that:
, . . the person who is subject to audit shall be crowned
after he shall have rendered account and submitted to
audit of his office.5
Also,
. . . the officer who has not yet submitted his accounts
shall not leave the country. Furthermore, the man who is
subject to audit is not allowed to consecrate his property,
or to make a votive offering, or to receive adoption, or to
dispose of his property by will; and he is under many other
prohibitions.
. . . A man who has received no public funds and spent
none, but has simply had something to do with administrative matters is also commanded to render accounts to
the auditors. The law commands him to file precisely this
statement: "I have neither received nor spent any public
funds." There is nothing in all the state that is exempt
from audit, investigation, and examination.6
Such legal requirements made the administration of public funds by
the magistrates more effective. Finally, public officials were required to maintain accounts for amounts received, spent, and balances, and keep decrees of authorization and other supporting documents in the Council Chamber. This requirement was necessary
so that the verification process by the three boards of state accountants could be executed more effectively. The accounting boards
and the nature of the accounting work are adequately explained by
Aristotle in his Constitution. He distinguishes between three boards
of accountants, each of ten men; the Council Accountants, the Administration Accountants, assisted by ten Assessors, and ten Examiners, assisted by twenty Assessors. Together these accountants
constituted the highest scrutinizing authority in Athens. The nature
of their office, i.e., their qualifications and methods of selection are
explained below.
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Function of the Board of Council Accountants
The ten Council Accountants were selected from the five hundred
members of the Council. This was essential since the Council exercised supreme authority regarding the economic affairs of the state.
The selection procedures and the accountants' duties are explained
by Aristotle, stating that "the Council also elect by lot ten of their
own body Accountants, to keep the accounts of the officials for each
presidency." 7 These people performed a function similar to that of
internal auditors. Thus, they were charged with the responsibility of
scrutinizing regularly the financial dealings of all magistrates, particularly those who administered public funds. Such a system provided for a continuing audit which accomplished two objectives:
(a) it helped protect the financial resources of the state, since any
possible case of embezzlement or fraud could be detected and
remedied earlier; and (b) it prepared the groundwork for the final
independent audit and examination of the magistrates performed by
the next board of auditors, known as Administration Accountants.
Function of the Board of Administration

Accountants

These Administration Accountants performed a second type of
economic investigation, i.e., a kind of independent audit, when the
public officials were relinquishing their offices. Accordingly, the
Council:
. . . elect by lot ten Auditors and ten Assessors with them
to whom all retiring officials have to render account. For
these are the only magistrates who audit the returns of
officials liable to account and bring the audits before the
Jury-courts.8
Dealing principally with the financial side of the magistrate's government, they were the sole authorities who investigated both the
financial and administrative transactions of an "answerable" magistrate.
The audit work had to be performed by the ten auditors and their
ten assistant or advocates within thirty days of the date of expiration
of the magistrate's term. To carry out the final scrutiny in such a
short period of time required hard work by the auditors and their
assistants. However, the groundwork for their task had been done
by the Council Accountants, who had investigated the accounts in
each prytany (a period lasting 36 to 37 days). The audit was based
on objective evidence furnished by the records. The auditors had
to be impartial and fair in performing their work. In other words,
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When we take our seats to audit the accounts of expenditures, it doubtless sometimes happens that we come from
home with a false impression; nevertheless, when the accounts have been balanced, no man is so stubborn as to
refuse, before he leaves the room, to assent to that conclusion, whatever it may be, which the figures themselves
establish.9
The magistrate first had to submit his account in person as the
first step in the auditing procedure. Then, he testified that he now
gave up the office entrusted in him, and that he awaited his summons to an audit before the board of accountants. At the same time
he submitted the relevant report to the Secretary of the Council,10
who attended Council meetings, and was responsible for the safeguarding of all decrees and other official documents. The collaboration between the Secretary and the accountants was necessary,
because the latter checked the magistrate's report against the official documents kept in the Council Chamber. Immediately after the
audit of the accounts, the Administration Accountants summoned
the magistrates to the Accounting Offices to render the accounts
and to submit to examination once more in public. If the Administrative Accountants' findings were unfavorable to the magistrate,
their report was turned over to the jury-court for further action.
The Jury-Court
Aristotle, in his Constitution, as well as the orators Aeschines and
Demosthenes in their private speeches, provide an abundant and
reliable compilation of information about the jurisdiction of the jurycourt. After a public official had terminated his office the auditors
submitted the results of their audits to these courts for public hearing. Accordingly,
. . . if an official is proven to have committed peculation
the jury convict him of peculation, and the fine is ten
times the amount of which he is found guilty; and if they
show that a man has taken bribes and the Jury convict,
they assess the value of the bribes and in this case the
fine is ten times the amount; but if they find him guilty of
maladministration, they assess the damage, and the fine
paid is the amount only, provided that it is paid before the
ninth presidency, otherwise it is doubled. But a fine of ten
times the amount is not doubled.11
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For example, in one case Theocrines was charged to pay a fine of
seven hundred drachmas which he was sentenced at the audit to pay
to the eponymus of his tribe.12 In addition to their findings, the
Board of Administrative Accountants was allowed by law and custom
to make the following proclamation in front of the Jury-Court in the
process of public hearing: "Who wishes to prefer charges?" This
gave the opportunity to any citizen to make an accusation against
public officials. This procedure, which had the obvious purpose of
establishing closer control over the magistrates, was criticized by
Demosthenes as "the harsh enactments made against the common
people." 14 His statement may be justified, because under such law
even the most virtuous magistrate might be the victim of an adverse
verdict given according to a false accusation made by some citizen.
Finally, the auditors had the power themselves to bring an "answerable" official before the court for theft, provided their audit had
shown him guilty of embezzlement. Similar power was given to them
to summon any magistrate to the law courts, even though the results
of the audit were negative. However, because the large number of
officials who had to render their accounts, they could not be brought
before the court a second time. In other words, the law did not
allow the same person to be subject to trials, examinations, or counter-proceedings a second time on the same charge.
The previous discussion indicates that the judicial proceedings
followed the customary judicial course of the defense of the magistrate under accusation. The verdict of the jury followed. It also indicates that the auditors themselves assumed judicial responsibility
in that they presided over the court and their assistants read out
the charges.
After the "answerable" magistrate had appeared before the court
and had publicly passed his examination, he was regarded as having "submitted to examination in the lawcourts, according to the
law." The auditor then reported the findings by engraving them in
marble and exhibiting them to the public so that every citizen could
become informed with regard to the management of public funds.
Exhibit A illustrates the kind of reports prepared and published by
the independent auditors.
Function of the Board of Examiners
Even with these rigorous auditing requirements, the state was not
satisfied as to the proper management of its funds. The fact that
the magistrate had submitted to examination did not signify his full
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and final discharge from his accountability. An additional assurance
was deemed necessary through another scrutinizing process, exercized by a third accounting board, the Examiners.
The procedures for their selection and duties are well described
by Aristotle, stating that the Council also
. . . elect by lot Auditors (Examiners), one for each tribe,
and two Assessors for each Auditor and if anyone wished
to prefer a charge against any magistrate who has rendered
his accounts before the Jury-Court, he writes on a table
his own name and that of the defendant, and the offenses
of which he accuses him and he gives it to the Auditor:
and the Auditor takes it and reads it, and if he considers
the charges proven, he hands it over to the Jury-Courts.15
These ten examiners and their twenty assessors did not form part of
the Council. The assessors took their seats at the market-place,
which was the most frequented part of the city. They accepted accusations by any citizen against magistrates who had already submitted to examination. The accusations were written on a "whitewashed tablet" and were given to the Examiner of the tribe to which
the magistrate belonged. The Examiner at once held a preliminary
inquiry and, along with the assessors, investigated the charge. Private charges were brought before the "the local judges," while
public charges were brought before the Thesmothetae (legislators),
who introduced the case to the Heliaia, (the Supreme Criminal
Court), whose decisions were final and could not be reversed.
Other Functions of the State Accountants
In addition to the regular accounting duties, accountants often assumed the task of conducting unannounced audits at irregular time
intervals in those cases where it was considered necessary. This
was very common with regard to the handling of funds for the payment of mercenary troops. The size of these funds along with the
weak payroll system used gave many opportunities for dishonesty,
especially in the padding of the rolls, and auditors were sent out to
check the accounts on the spot. Aeschines, for example, mentions
that Demosthenes was charged in a conspiracy of having padded
the rolls and an inspector (auditor) of the mercenary troops was
sent to Eretria.16
Finally, the accountants audited the work of the Hellenotamiae,
whose duty it was to collect the tribute due to Athens by the allies
and deposit 1/60 of the total in the Treasury of Goddess Athena.
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So, without exception, any person who had held any public trust was
subject to audit, even the highest state officials such as the
Hellenotamiae.
The number of accountants who performed the accounting function for the state during the fifth century, as mentioned in the accounting records, was thirty. This seems to coincide with the
accountants included in the three accounting boards discussed by
Aristotle. Whether the thirty accountants originally constituted one
board or were divided into three boards is not clear from the sources
available.
The existence and execution of the aforementioned verification
process as it relates to the accounting system is important. In addition to controls by independent boards there is also a formal basis
for the establishment of accountability against those to whom public
funds were entrusted. Furthermore, the execution of this verification process implies the existence of accounting records of execution for all revenues and expenditures kept by the responsible public officials. Finally, the comparison of actual amounts received and
expended with the authorized amounts in the execution of audit
substantiates further the integration of the budget system with the
accounting system.17 Thus, it can be concluded that although the
main purpose of the attest function was the discovery of fraud, internal controls were also evaluated by comparing the formalized
budgets with the accounting records of execution.18 This conclusion is somewhat contrary to the assumption that internal controls
were not recognized in ancient times.19
EXHIBIT A
EXPENDITURES FOR THE CONSTRUCTION
OF THE PARTHENON
FOR THE YEAR 434 B.C.
(Partial Translation)
A. Amounts Received
The following amounts were received by the commissioners on
public works during the year when Anticles was their secretary, on
the fourteenth Council when Metagenes was first secretary and
Kratetos was archon of the Athenians:
1. Balance from the previous year, 1,470 drachmas, 70 Lampsacene and 27-1/6 Cyzicene golden staters. (lines 1-16)
2. From the treasurers of Athena of whom Labreus was secretary,
25,000 drachmas, (lines 17-20)
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3. From sale of gold, having weight of 98 drachmas, 1,372 drachmas. (lines 21-23)
4. From sale of ivory, having weight of 20 talents and 60 drachmas, 1,305 drachmas and 4 obols. (lines 24-26)
B. Amounts Spent
1. For rentals . . . . drachmas. (line 30)
2. Wages to workers who quarried and loaded marble at Pentelicus, 2,226 drachmas and 2 obols. (lines 31-33)
3. Paid to statuaries on pediment-sculptures, 16,200 drachmas.
(line 34)
4. Salaries to staff members, 192 drachmas. (lines 35-36)
5. Other construction costs, 1,800 drachmas. (line 37)
C. Amounts Left at the End of the Year
1. 70 Lampsacene and 27-1/6 Cyzicene golden staters. (lines
40-43)
Source:

Tod, op. cit., pp. 112-113.
FOOTNOTES
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Rackham, pp. 135-147.
3
The Athenian senatorial year was divided into ten presidencies or prytanies.
Each presidency of the Council and the Assembly was taken over by a committee
of fifty representatives of the ten tribes for a period of 35-36 days, so that during
the year all five hundred members of the Council could participate in the management of state affairs. Magistrates, upon leaving office, submitted their accounts
to a board of ten auditors, one from each tribe, appointed by the Council.
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5
Adams, p. 317.
6
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